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Introduction
Li-Chen Sim and Jonathan Fulton

In 2019 we published External Powers and the Gulf Monarchies, a co-edited
book that analyzed the approaches of extra-regional powers toward the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) member states.1 Our focus was not limited to Asian
countries in that book, instead looking at how a wide range of countries were pursuing multifaceted relations with a set of countries that play important roles in the
global economy, most notably in energy markets but also in trade, investment, and
finance. When that economic significance is combined with a geographic location that serves as a Eurasian and Indian Ocean hub connecting Asia, Africa, and
Europe, the Persian Gulf makes for a fascinating subregion from which to consider emerging geopolitical trends.
One of the key themes of that book was a looming order transition in the Gulf.
As a result of shifting distribution of power at the systemic level, with the US relative power and influence decreasing, the ordering principles that had explained
international politics in the Gulf since the end of the Cold War were changing.
Because of this, we anticipated a deeper level of engagement in strategic concerns
from both Gulf leaders and a range of extra-regional states with interests in the
Gulf.2
Since then, this analysis seems increasingly accurate. Writing this chapter in
early 2022, it is surprising how much distance there is between the leaders of the
GCC countries – especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) –
and their counterparts in the US. An oft-repeated refrain, for instance, is that “the
United States is becoming increasingly less reliable as a long term partner”3 even
though there is ample evidence of continuing US interests in the region.4 This
distance is frequently attributed to preferences or attitudes of US political leaders
such as when the Senate voted in 2018 to end support for the Saudis in Yemen,
but as Quilliam noted in 2020,
irrespective of president, the US has embarked upon a slow and inexorable
withdrawal from the Gulf. The change is symptomatic of a structural shift in
the balance of global power, rather than an expression of the proclivities of
presidents Obama and Trump.5
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During the Biden administration the trend has not reversed. In the early days of
the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Biden was reportedly unable to reach
the Saudi and Abu Dhabi Crown Princes for a telephone meeting to discuss the
war’s impact on global energy prices; they refused to take his call.6
Regional allies and partners have become convinced that the US commitment to the Gulf is soft, and in response have been charting foreign policies that
diverge from Washington’s on certain issues. The US pullout from Afghanistan
in 2021 fed into the belief of US retrenchment from the Middle East,7 with the
UAE’s diplomatic advisor to the president and former Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash saying,
We will see in the coming period what is going on with regards to America’s
footprint in the region. I don’t think we know yet, but Afghanistan is definitely a test and, to be honest, it is a very worrying test.8
It is not simply a matter of signaling. Washington has determined the IndoPacific is its priority theater and China is its primary strategic competitor.9 While
the Middle East and North African region is perceived to be less relevant to
Washington’s foreign and defense policy than at any other point since the late
Cold War, the commensurate value of Transatlantic ties has been greatly enhanced
as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The inevitable outcome is that Gulf leaders have been diversifying their extraregional partnerships in response. They have also been in the process of reconsidering regional partnerships and rivalries. Diplomatic normalization between
Israel and the UAE and Bahrain is evidence of this, with leaders in each country
pursuing regional alignments that support their preferences of regional order.10
There has even been outreach to Turkey and Iran in line with the widespread perception that tensions of the past decade had reached an unsustainable level. With
uncertainty about the direction of US–Gulf relations, regional leaders have been
more assertive in pursuing their own approaches to the security issues they face.
Extra-regional countries with interests in the Gulf need to reconsider their
approaches to the region as well.11 US security commitments set the organizing
principles of the Gulf throughout the post-Cold War era, and this allowed many
countries to develop substantial regional presences dominated by economic opportunities without corresponding security roles. The possibility of US retrenchment
changes the logic and cost-benefit calculation for them, and governments and
companies in these countries will also have to recalibrate their Gulf policies.
This book examines how the evolving Gulf order affects the regional interests
of Asian countries by offering a deep dive into the strategic considerations facing policy-makers in China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, and Pakistan.
Each of these countries have deep interests in the Gulf, although there is variation
between them, and as such they are vulnerable to the consequences of instability
in the Gulf. A regional order transition therefore must be considered seriously,
even if reluctantly, among their respective policy communities. Asian countries
are major trade partners throughout the Gulf, with China, India, Japan, and South
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Korea regularly among the top ten markets for the GCC as well as Iran and Iraq.
Of course, energy trade is – and will continue to be – central to this. The tremendous economic growth in Asia over decades has required Gulf hydrocarbons; at
the same time, Gulf human resource challenges and acute development needs
have required Asian labor, capital, technical knowledge, and contracting. The
resulting economic synergy between the Gulf subregion and Asia creates a degree
of interdependence that could easily verge on vulnerability particularly if globalization recedes.
Many reading this will point out that the Gulf is already an Asian region to
begin with. Both Chinese and Indian governments, for example, refer to it as a
part of West Asia. Funabashi’s seminal Foreign Affairs article from 1993, ‘The
Asianization of Asia,’12 discussed the shift in core–periphery dynamics as Asian
countries had reached such levels of development that they had come to see each
other as primary partners or competitors; Western dominance in Asia, a historical
outlier, no longer explained the region’s political or economic order. As Gulf and
Asian economies have steadily integrated, a growing body of academic work has
adopted a more expansive understanding of Funabashi’s ‘Asianization’ framework to explain this deeper engagement.13
This volume builds upon that work by addressing how Asian countries consider issues of Gulf security and insecurity in the context of their own interests.
This is a topic that has not been studied widely yet, largely because of the dynamics described above. With the exception of Japan, the emergence of Asian countries as major economic actors in the modern Gulf is a recent phenomenon, and
throughout much of this period US political, military, and economic dominance
established patterns of engagement. Its allies and partners in the GCC cooperated
with its allies and partners in Asia, with China seen as a free-rider that was still
content to follow the leader. Little research was done on security issues because
there was relatively little to study.14
We believe this is changing. A new dynamic in the international relations of
the Gulf is evident: the arrival of Asian countries as major extra-regional actors.
The underlying assumption is not that Asian powers have already become important security actors in the Gulf, but rather than they perceive the Gulf as a region
of increasing strategic relevance. This leads us to consider several questions: How
have Gulf security considerations informed the foreign policy of Asian countries?
How will leaders in Asia adjust to an evolving regional framework? Will Asian
rivalries make the region a theater of competition? Can we expect Asian states to
balance, bandwagon, hedge, or adopt some other approach to their Gulf relationships? To what extent do their relationships with the US influence their approach
to the Gulf? Such questions become all the more important as the western boundaries of Asia increasingly come to incorporate the Middle East.
That is not to underestimate the serious complications inherent in Gulf–Asia
relations. As each of the chapters here emphasize, the countries in question face
significant domestic political and economic pressures that limit their willingness
or ability to play a more robust security role in the Gulf. Among many publics
in the countries studied here the Gulf is not perceived as a high priority; pressing
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concerns closer to home will always feature more significantly on the agenda.
In India and Pakistan, South Asia is of vastly more immediate importance,
Singaporeans are preoccupied with Indonesia and Malaysia, and China, Japan,
and South Korea have significant challenges within East Asia. In many cases, as is
evident throughout this book, these countries see each other as threats in their own
regions, limiting the military resources they could divert to the Gulf. A related
consideration is the challenging security environment throughout Asia. First and
foremost is US–China strategic competition, which presents immediate threats
and dilemmas for many Asian countries.15 Much like in the Gulf, a changing distribution of power in the Asian regional order is underway, and the consequences
of this will result in an order transition.16 Add to this the fragmented political and
security landscape of Asia itself; as Michael Cox points out, it “hardly exists as a
collective actor.”17 There is a deep literature featuring optimistic narratives of an
Asian Century,18 but this work often ignores or under-represents the deep-rooted
rivalries that have the potential to make for a highly unstable region.19
With this book we present a novel analysis of Gulf–Asia relations. This set of
empirically rich, theory-driven case studies was written by experts from or based
in the Asian countries in question who have deep engagement with the Gulf; their
analysis was largely drawn from local sources in multiple relevant languages. The
chapters encompass Asian states in different subregions of Asia – South Asia,
Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia – and with different power configurations –
middle powers and great powers – in the international system. Cognizant of the
heterogeneity of Asia – in terms of territorial and population size, level of economic development, political regime types, attitudes toward great powers, and
religious affiliations, among others – we have privileged in-depth country studies
over thematic considerations.
In Chapter 2, Jonathan Fulton presents an analysis of the Gulf as a regional
security complex in the early stages of an order transition. US hegemony has been
the ordering principle of the Gulf since the end of the Cold War, but in recent
years America’s military preponderance has been paired with a declining interest
in regional leadership. Accurate or not, the resulting perception of a hegemonic
retreat will impact the regional policies of all states with interests in the Gulf. For
the Asian states studied in this volume, it becomes more complicated as they have
to manage their relationships with states in the Gulf within the dual contexts of
intra-regional rivalries as well as US–China great power competition.
In Chapter 3, Degang Sun argues that China seeks a zero-enemy policy in
the Gulf by building a network of partnerships in order to dilute the US security
alliance system. He identifies five pathways that have defined China’s attempts
to respond to the Gulf security environment and concludes that these have successfully de-linked the global cold war (US–China rivalry) with the Gulf cold
war (Saudi–Iranian confrontation). Consequently, China has, for now, avoided
the participation of Gulf states in any potential US-led Gulf strategic alliance
targeting China.
The role of the US is also a key consideration in the chapters on Japan and South
Korea, both of which are alliance partners of the US. In Chapter 4, Yee-Kuang
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Heng examines Japan’s attempts to hedge and forge a more independent position
from the US in Gulf affairs. Ultimately, he concludes that Japan has been unable
to shape the evolving regional security architecture, notably on Iran and the GCC
dispute; its security role therefore remains nascent.
In Chapter 5, Haewon Jeong writes about the Republic of Korea’s decision to
independently deploy the Cheonghae unit to the Strait of Hormuz. She adopts a
securitization framework to explain that the US alliance was merely one of the
considerations for the military dispatch. Pressure from domestic stakeholders was
also key in shaping the contours of the deployment.
In Chapter 6, Li-Chen Sim references Singapore’s strategic culture of ‘vulnerability’ and its impact on relations with the Gulf. She finds that while concerns about public order in Singapore prompted the initial impetus to engage
with the Gulf states in the 21st century, the city-state’s interests in economic
prosperity and energy security largely mitigated perceptions of Gulf insecurity
and instability.
The role of domestic considerations is also reflected in Mudassir Quamar’s
study on India in Chapter 7. The presence of a large Indian expatriate community
in the six GCC countries and Indian dependence on the region for energy security
make Gulf (in)security an internal political issue. At the same time, regional tensions and foreign policy responses of friendly and rival powers, including the US
and China, inform New Delhi’s room for maneuver.
In Chapter 8, Umer Karim presents a study of the interconnected nature of
South Asia and the Gulf, using Pakistan–Gulf relations as a framework. He discusses the importance of Islam, elite relations, and military support as factors that
contributed to a substantial Pakistani role in the Gulf’s security architecture.
In Chapter 9, N. Janardhan considers the prospect of a post-US-led security
framework for the Gulf, in which Asian countries are significant partners in a
collective security approach. He posits that Gulf countries see Asian powers as
important future allies, transitioning from transactional economic actors to agents
capable of affecting regional geopolitics.
Going forward, we envision opportunities for an inside-out approach whereby
Gulf states and entities at the subnational level weigh in on competition by extraregional powers to engage them. A companion volume, written by Gulf experts,
presenting Gulf perceptions of Asian engagement, would be a welcome addition
to the literature on Gulf–Asia relations.
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